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THE REFORM BLINDSPOT
Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe,* Shelly Richter,** & Dayja Tillman***

ABSTRACT
The last few years have seen a marked shift in the public’s response to
mass incarceration. Some state legislatures have responded by changing
criminal statutes and sentencing schemes to reduce the number of people
incarcerated in jails and prisons and lessen the collateral consequences
faced by those previously convicted of crimes. Although these efforts are
laudable, they may fail to consider the limitations imposed upon convicted
persons seeking to avail themselves of these benefits without the assistance
of counsel. This essay argues that, in addressing the question of how best to
effectuate the progressive goals of criminal justice reform, it is critical to
view the issue through Fourteenth Amendment theories supporting the
right to counsel on appeal. This avenue promises a reasonable and feasible
method of providing the type of legal support that is necessary to ensure
reform statutes are accessible to those they were created to help.
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I. INTRODUCTION

M

ORE than seventeen years ago, then twenty-seven-year-old
Khalil was convicted of possessing less than a quarter of an
ounce of marijuana.1 In the years since, this criminal conviction
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1. John Washington, He Was Arrested for Marijuana 17 Years Ago. Now It’s Legal.
So Why Is He Still Guilty of a Crime?, VOX: THE HIGHLIGHT (Dec. 10, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/21749376/marijuana-expungements-biden-harris-convic-
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has influenced Khalil’s quality of life in markedly negative ways.2 This is
his reality, even though in the seventeen years since his conviction, his
home state of Massachusetts has traveled a legislative road to legalizing
the use of such small amounts of marijuana.3 Some of the disruption remaining in Khalil’s life from that single conviction is due to the Massachusetts legislature’s failure to address the removal of criminal
consequences for those convicted of marijuana possession decades before
the drug’s legalization.4 Indeed, it was not until two years after marijuana
was legalized in Massachusetts that community leaders successfully petitioned for an expungement statute to remove the taint of prior marijuana
convictions.5 For Khalil, despite being represented by counsel, the added
availability of expungement has done little to improve his circumstances,
as the process has proven slow and cumbersome with ill-defined standards.6 Others are in an even worse position than Khalil, lacking legal
representation to support them in pursuing the advantages of this progressive change to the state’s criminal code.7
Unlike other reform efforts, expungements do not necessarily provoke
adversarial engagement; they often appear instead as routine administrative procedures.8 An expungement usually requires a judge to determine
that clearing the record is in the interest of justice.9 This can be shown
with a clear recitation of the difficulties the conviction imposes on the
person’s life.10 Yet even with the easier navigation of expungement law,
ordinary citizens have found it difficult to expunge their convictions without the help of legal counsel.11 In recognition of the obstacles to this otherwise routine effort to improve the criminal justice system, law schools
have developed expungement clinics, and some better-resourced public
defender offices have expungement days or divisions.12 The limited availtion-drug-war [https://perma.cc/H6NJ-N8AD] (Khalil’s legal name is excluded from publication to preserve anonymity).
2. One of the most damaging impacts of Khalil’s conviction is that now, at forty-four
years old, Khalil still cannot find a job due to the conviction on his record. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Kristian Hernández, More States Consider Automatic Criminal Record
Expungement, PEW (May 25, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2021/05/25/more-states-consider-automatic-criminal-record-expungement
[https://perma.cc/66RR-6QVB] (observing that a “growing number of states are trying to
ease the burden of expungement and record clearing by making the process
automatic . . . .”).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West, Westlaw through Ch.19 of 2021 Reg. Sess.);
Washington, supra note 1.
10. See Pauline Quirion, Sealing and Expungement After Massachusetts Criminal Justice Reform, 100 MASS. L. REV. 100, 108 (2019) (explaining different factors considered by
judges, including “disadvantages [to petitioner] if the record is left open” and “stigma related to the offense”).
11. See Washington, supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Cmty. L. Clinic, Criminal Record Expungement, STAN. L. SCH., https://
law.stanford.edu/community-law-clinic/criminal-record-expungement [https://perma.cc/
X37Q-SN9B].
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ability of these enterprises, however, means many individuals do not have
access to counsel to aid in expunging their convictions.13 This fact should
caution legislators who are pursuing criminal justice reform efforts. Expungements are an area where criminal justice can progress more easily,
yet it has proven harder to access than one would imagine.
Changes to criminal statutes that apply retroactively initiate complicated analyses about the right to counsel and the role counsel should play
in post-conviction proceedings. For example, sentencing reductions involve questions about how much time is appropriate for a person to serve
given the change in the substantive criminal law.14 These could include
whether a person should be entirely released from custody.15 Applications for such resentencing can prompt adversarial engagement from
prosecutors, law enforcement, and crime victims invested in maintaining
the initial sentence the court imposed.16 If these changes to a criminal
statute occur after a person’s conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal, however, she may not be entitled to state-funded counsel to aid in
taking advantage of these reforms.17 Without the assistance of counsel,
those eligible for resentencing would need to assert legal theories and
present evidence to a court on their own without any formal legal training. This responsibility could make achieving success under these statutes
aimed at reform more difficult or even unlikely, practically curbing the
stated purpose of these changes.
This essay illustrates how the legal system should fulfill the progressive
promises of criminal justice reform when an attorney might be a critical
component of doing so because the required proceedings can be adversarial. The excessive nature of current public defender caseloads warns
against trying to meet that need by adding to the already stretched-beyond-capacity Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at
the trial level.18 Adding this obligation to an institution already
overburdened and under-resourced by the criminal justice system is a potentially inefficient way of providing the type of effective representation
necessary to pursue these new benefits. It would likely serve only to
stretch these resources even thinner. Instead, the appellate system and
fundamental Fourteenth Amendment theories behind the right to counsel
on appeal provide a solution to the problem at hand.
13. See Washington, supra note 1.
14. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
18. See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Regulating Mass Prosecution, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1175, 1177–81, 1177 n.4 (2020) [hereinafter Mass Prosecution]; Phil McCausland, Public
Defenders Nationwide Say They’re Overworked and Underfunded, NBC NEWS (Dec. 11,
2017, 4:55 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/public-defenders-nationwide-saythey-re-overworked-underfunded-n828111 [https://perma.cc/P29T-AV6A]; Andrew Cohen,
How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After ‘Gideon,’ ATLANTIC (Mar. 13,
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-rightto-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433 [perma.cc/8JP6-JA3F].
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This essay proceeds in three parts. Part II describes several criminal
justice reform priorities in California, a state popularly considered a liberal bastion for advancement in the criminal law arena. This Part details
how the absence of a right to counsel may contribute to results more
conservative than expected. Part III discusses the applicability of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part IV explores the ability of appellate counsel to participate more fully in achieving the goals of these progressive reforms. Although this essay focuses its study on California law,
it serves as a tool for reconsidering how reform efforts should proceed in
other states. Indeed, if institutions in California are unable to adequately
meet this urgent call for reformation, then other states must take seriously the characterization of what is missing from California’s criminal
justice reform effort.
II. CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM PROMISES
California, possessing one of the highest rates of incarceration in the
world, has attempted to lead the charge in criminal justice reform.19 The
state legislature has passed a plethora of reform bills in the hope of alleviating California’s contributions to mass incarceration.20 One of the most
significant reforms to hit the state’s criminal justice system was California
Assembly Bill (AB) 109,21 also known as Realignment.22 Passed as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate to reduce California’s severely
overcrowded prisons,23 AB 109 and its companion, AB 117,24 transferred
the responsibility for managing adults convicted of certain low-level felonies to the county level from the state level.25 Realignment also saw the
transfer of some individuals convicted of nonviolent and low-level of19. California Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/
CA.html [https://perma.cc/2W24-KLMX]; see also SARAH LAWRENCE, CALIFORNIA IN
CONTEXT: HOW DOES CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM COMPARE TO OTHER
STATES? 5 fig.4 (2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/CA_in_Context_Policy_Brief_Sept_2012_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZP2-BD28]; Kevin Rector, Anita
Chabria, James Queally & Benjamin Oreskes, California Goes Big on Criminal Justice Reform, Setting a More Progressive Path, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-11-05/after-contentious-year-in-american-policing-voters-in-l-aacross-california-back-justice-reforms [https://perma.cc/2SYW-SPRJ].
20. See SCOTT GRAVES, CAL. BUDGET & POL’Y CTR., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IS
WORKING IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2020), https://calbudgetcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
08/CA_Budget_Center_5-Facts-criminal-justice_Aug2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QHYQPAN]. But see also Tim Arango, Reform Pruned California’s Inmate Totals, but Critics
Persist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019) at A10 (describing how California still has to engage in
more meaningful reform).
21. 2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch.
15 (West); see also California Realignment, STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR., STAN. L. SCH., https://
law.stanford.edu/stanford-criminal-justice-center-scjc/california-realignment [https://
perma.cc/PVA6-4XKH].
22. LISA T. QUAN, SARA ABARBANEL & DEBBIE MUKAMAL, REALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY: CHANGES TO THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA POST-REALIGNMENT 5 (2014), https://law.stanford.edu/index.php?webauth-document=child-page/183091/
doc/slspublic/CC%20Bulletin%20Jan%2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JAS-9DMB].
23. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011); QUAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5.
24. Act of June 30, 2011, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 39 (West).
25. QUAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5.
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fenses to supervision in lieu of incarceration.26
Realignment was only the beginning of California’s modern push for
criminal justice reform. In 2012, Proposition 36 was passed, which revised
California’s notorious three-strikes law.27 In 2014, California voters
passed Proposition 47, also known as the Safe Neighborhoods and
Schools Act.28 This proposition reduced the penalties for certain lowlevel drug and property offenses, reclassifying them from felonies to misdemeanors.29 The intent and effect of these two propositions was to lower
the number of people entering, and remaining in, California prisons.30
More recently, California enacted legislation to address issues salient in
criminal justice reform conversations today. These include laws that address racial disparities in trials and sentencing, as well as police use of
deadly force.31 For example, the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 created a pathway to relief in the form of a new trial for defendants whose
cases were infected by racial bias.32 These statutes are important steps in
26. Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and its Impact on Local Criminal
Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 332, 337 n.54 (2014).
27. Cal. Prop. 36, Three Strikes Law. Repeat Felony Offenders. Penalties. (2012),
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2314&context=CA_ballot_props [https://perma.cc/CLM2-BMYK]; see also MIA BIRD, MAGNUS LOFSTROM,
BRANDON MARTIN, STEVEN RAPHAEL & VIET NGUYEN, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 47 ON CRIME AND RECIDIVISM 4 (2018), https://www.ppic.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_0618mbr.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VUS-BVCP]; Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 28 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). This was “the first voter
initiative since the Civil War to reduce the sentences of inmates currently behind bars.”
Three Strikes Basics, THREE STRIKES PROJECT, STAN L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-justice-advocacy-project/three-strikes-basics [https://perma.cc/Q9RP-69UY].
28. Cal. Prop. 47, Criminal Sentences. Misdemeanor Penalties. (2014), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2325&context=CA_ballot_props [https://
perma.cc/G2W6-42KX]; see also BIRD ET AL., supra note 27, at 4; Proposition 47: The Safe
Neighborhoods and Schools Act, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/prop47.htm [https://
perma.cc/F9YZ-KLWR].
29. BIRD ET AL., supra note 27, at 4.
30. See id. at 4–5.
31. See Jamilah King & Samantha Michaels, California Just Passed New Limits on
Police Use of Force. Not Everyone Is Happy With the Compromise., MOTHER JONES (Aug.
19, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/08/california-newsom-policeuse-of-force-bill-stephon-clark-black-lives-matter-opposition [https://perma.cc/H3XD6JWL]. Further, the CRISES Act, which Governor Newsom vetoed, would have provided
grants to community organizations to fund and develop non-law enforcement responses for
crises related to mental health, substance use, intimate partner and community violence,
and natural disasters. See Anthony Pignataro, Could This Bill Be a First Step Toward Taking the Police Out of Policing?, L.A. MAG. (Jun. 5, 2020), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/crises-act-ab-2054-police [https://perma.cc/7PVY-3QNS]; B–2054 Emergency Services,
CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201920200AB2054 [https://perma.cc/J2RR-E5X7].
32. California Racial Justice Act of 2020, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 317, § 3 (West)
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 745, 1473); see also Ashley Chamber & Roseryn Bhudsabourg, Racial Justice Act Passes California Senate Public Safety Committee, ELLA BAKER
CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://ellabakercenter.org/press/racial-justice-actpasses-california-senate-public-safety-committee [https://perma.cc/PG26-CDPP]. The California legislature is now considering legislation that would ensure the Racial Justice Act
can be applied retroactively for all Californians. California Racial Justice Act for All Passes
First Legislative Committee, CA STATE ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://asmdc.org/press-releases/california-racial-justice-act-all-passes-first-legislative-committee [https://perma.cc/QN42-MR5F].
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the path to criminal justice reform, but the success of any reform statute
is best evaluated by how many people are able to benefit and in what
ways they are able to do so.33
The path of Adnan Khan provides a notable example of California’s
progress in criminal justice reform. When he was twenty-eight years old,
Khan was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life in prison under
California’s felony-murder rule.34 While incarcerated he became deeply
involved in efforts to reform the state’s felony-murder rule.35 His and
others’ efforts were ultimately successful: Senate Bill (SB) 1437 was
signed into law in 2018, altering the definition of felony murder.36 Prior to
the bill’s passage, a person who, for example, took part in a burglary that
resulted in a person’s death could be convicted of murder, even if the
person did not do the killing and did not intend for anyone to be killed.37
SB 1437 changed that.38 Notably, like many important criminal justice
reform efforts, the law affects not only cases in the future but also convictions long since final, like Khan’s.39 It does so by setting out a multistage
petition process in California Penal Code section 1170.95.40 Thus, this
statute has the remarkable potential to vacate murder convictions and
drastically reduce the sentences of people who have been incarcerated for
years under a theory of murder now considered excessive and unfair.41
33. See Adam Gelb, You Get What You Measure: New Performance Indicators Needed
to Gauge Progress of Criminal Justice Reform, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. (May 2018),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/files/you_get_
what_you_measure.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ94-SBXP] (reflecting on the need for “new
performance measures that shed light on progress” toward criminal justice reform, with the
“raw number of people in prison” a factor).
34. About Adnan Khan, RE:STORE JUST., https://restorecal.org/author/adnan [https://
perma.cc/R3V7-3FHF].
35. Id.
36. See Act of Sept. 30, 2018, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1015 (West) (codified at CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 188, 189(e), 1170.95).
37. See Claire Trageser, California’s Felony Murder Law Change Means Freedom for
San Diego Man, KPBS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2020/feb/26/after-16years-prison-californias-felony-murder-la [https://perma.cc/86J5-GN53] (describing the
case of Shawn Khalifa, who was convicted of felony murder at fifteen after acting as a
lookout in a home invasion that resulted in the homeowner’s death); Press Release, Nancy
Skinner, Senator, California State Senate, They Didn’t Kill, Why Is It Murder? Senators
Skinner, Anderson and Advocates Rally for SB 1437: Fixing Felony Murder (Aug. 21,
2018), https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20180821-they-didn%E2%80%99t-kill-why-it-murder-senators-skinner-anderson-and-advocates-rally-sb-1437 [https://perma.cc/TDA7-9SW3]
(quoting Sen. Skinner: “The felony murder law irrationally treats those who did not commit murder the same as those who did.”).
38. See Trageser, supra note 37.
39. See PENAL § 1170.95(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch.10 of 2021 Reg. Sess.) (“A
person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences
theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .”).
40. Id. § 1170.95(b)(1).
41. See id. § 1170.95; Lara Bazelon, Anissa Jordan Took Part in a Robbery. She Went
to Prison for Murder., ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2021/02/what-makes-a-murderer/617819 [https://perma.cc/R8F2-VKD4] (observing
that the California Supreme Court has described felony murder as “barbaric” and “Procrustean”). A similar bill being considered by the legislature would reform sentencing for
felony murder special circumstances and have retroactive application. See Eric Gelber,
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But there’s a hitch. The law has a statutory right-to-counsel provision,42
but California appellate courts initially interpreted its scope narrowly.43
Courts held, for example, that the provision does not confer a right to
counsel to pursue a petition until other requirements have been met.44
And under long-standing California precedent, individuals would not
have a right to counsel to file a petition based on federal or state constitutional standards.45 These two strands of case law mean that incarcerated
individuals must learn about and understand these new changes in the
law and bring petitions for resentencing pro se, a formidable task.46
It is important to note just how much more adversarial engagement a
petition brought under section 1170.95 invites than an application to expunge. A section 1170.95 petition challenges the finality of a murder conviction and seeks resentencing.47 Recall that Adnan Khan was sentenced
to a potential life term in prison for the death of a young man during an
attempted felony before he was resentenced.48 Predictably, resentencing
petitions involving crimes as sobering as homicide can meet with great
resistance from prosecutors, courts, victims, and other system stakeholdCalifornia Capitol Watch: Bill Would Reform Sentencing for Felony Murder Special Circumstances, DAVIS VANGUARD (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2021/04/california-capitol-watch-bill-would-reform-sentencing-for-felony-murder-specialcircumstances [https://perma.cc/2QN6-67MA] (“SB 300 also provides an avenue for currently incarcerated people sentenced to death or [life without parole] under the felony
murder special circumstance law to petition the court for resentencing, offering recourse to
Californians who have been unjustly sentenced.”).
42. PENAL § 1170.95(c) (“The court shall review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of this
section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner.”).
43. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265, 272–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), rev’d
and remanded, No. S260598, 2021 WL 3137434 (Cal. July 26, 2021). Khan himself had a
lawyer represent him as part of Re:Store Justice, the criminal justice reform organization
Khan co-founded while in prison. See Hope McKenney, ‘My Intentions Were Not to Kill’:
Adnan Khan Is First To Be Released From Prison Under New Law, KQED (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11720792/my-intentions-were-not-to-kill-adnan-khan-is-firstto-be-released-from-prison-under-new-law [https://perma.cc/ZC27-NUV9].
44. Lewis, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 273.
45. See People v. Rouse, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel concerns, holding that a petitioner has a
right to counsel at the resentencing phase but expressing no opinion as to whether the right
attaches at the eligibility stage).
46. Courts and scholars alike have observed the challenges that incarcerated individuals face in bringing self-represented petitions and appeals. See Emily Garcia Uhrig, The
Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1219, 1252–53 (2012); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620–21 (2005) (observing that
incarcerated persons are “particularly handicapped as self-representatives” due to high
rates of illiteracy, learning disabilities, and mental impairments); Martinez v. Ct. of App. of
Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (“No one, . . . attempts to argue that as a rule pro se representation is wise, desirable, or efficient.”). Under the California Supreme Court’s recent
resolution of People v. Lewis, however, these difficulties are less acute, as petitioners who
do bring facially sufficient petitions now must be appointed counsel. People v. Lewis, No.
S260598, 2021 WL 3137434, at *1 (Cal. July 26, 2021).
47. PENAL § 1170.95.
48. About Adnan Khan, supra note 34; McKenney, supra note 43.
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ers.49 This means defendants would greatly benefit from, and in some
cases could not prevail without, the assistance of legal counsel. As noted
in a recent amici curiae brief, courts had instead failed to appoint counsel
and summarily denied resentencing petitions.50 The brief, submitted by
the author of the legislation and one of its principal drafters, noted that
individuals had been solicited by lawyers to file resentencing petitions for
$12,000, an exorbitant amount for indigent people who are incarcerated
at the time they are seeking resentencing.51 For those who filed petitions
without counsel, summary denials (and appellate litigation) frequently
followed.52
Such summary denials are uniquely problematic with new laws redefining criminal behavior and establishing new sentencing schemes. This is
because there are inevitably many opaque applications of a new law that
have to be litigated. Yet courts may miss these issues if they summarily
deny petitions without the benefit of briefing and counsel alerting them
to the nonobvious issues that may be lurking—and it is the petitioners
who cannot afford to hire counsel who are harmed.53
Unfortunately, the problem of courts summarily denying the resentencing petitions of incarcerated individuals is not unusual. California Penal
Code section 1170.91,54 for example, is a new law providing for the resentencing of veterans, surely a much less controversial effort than section
1170.95.55 As with section 1170.95, individuals often must file petitions
under section 1170.91 without counsel.56 This has led to similar issues as
those described above. For example, even though the statute explicitly
requires courts to hold a hearing once they receive a resentencing petition,57 some courts have summarily denied these petitions without hear49. See Bazelon, supra note 41 (“California’s effort to dramatically change its felonymurder rule shows just how steep and winding the path to positive change can be.”); Jessica Pishko, Hundreds Stuck in California Prisons as Prosecutors Seek to Block New Law,
APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019), https://theappeal.org/hundreds-stuck-in-prison-in-california-asprosecutors-seek-to-block-new-law [https://perma.cc/5TBQ-ABCQ].
50. Julian Verdon & Linhchi Nguyen, Brief Filed on SB 1437 Alleges Courts Failing to
Appoint Counsel and Summarily Denying Resentencing Petitions, DAVIS VANGUARD (Nov.
17, 2020), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2020/11/brief-filed-on-sb-1437-alleges-courts-failing-to-appoint-counsel-and-summarily-denying-resentencing-petitions [https://perma.cc/
6DAK-G68N].
51. Brief Amici Curiae of the Honorable Nancy Skinner and the Justice Collaborative
Institute in Support of Appellant at 12–15, People v. Lewis, No. S260598 (Cal. July 26,
2021) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae, Lewis].
52. See id. at 29, 37.
53. See Verdon & Nguyen, supra note 50.
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.91 (West, Westlaw through Ch.10 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
55. See, e.g., Tori DeAngelis, Courts for Veterans See Exponential Growth, 47 AM.
PSYCH. ASS’N 20 (2016), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2016/12/courts-veterans (describing
the growth of veterans treatment courts, which began in 2008 as a single pilot program in
Buffalo and have swelled to 435 programs around the country).
56. Duncan MacVicar, Incarcerated Veterans in Need of Representation When Filing
Petitions for Resentencing, CAL. LAWS. ASS’N, https://calawyers.org/criminal-law/incarcerated-veterans-in-need-of-representation-when-filing-petitions-for-resentencing [https://
perma.cc/A7WE-YGRQ].
57. PENAL § 1170.91(b)(3) (“Upon receiving a petition under this subdivision, the
court shall determine, at a public hearing . . . .”).
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ings.58 In one petition for resentencing, U.S. Marine Corps veteran
Jonathan Bonilla-Bray explained to the court that his military service had
led to “serious mental health issues and substance abuse addiction.”59
Bonilla-Bray attached records to demonstrate as much.60 Though
Bonilla-Bray’s petition met all of the statutory requirements, the court
summarily denied it without holding a hearing.61 Had the court held a
hearing as required, Bonilla-Bray likely would have been able to show his
eligibility for resentencing, given that he met all the criteria.62 We should
ask why, what interaction of factors, led to Bonilla-Bray’s petition being
denied without even a hearing.
A final example suggests the presence of a lawyer is at least a factor in
how courts treat resentencing petitions. California Penal Code section
1473.7(a)(1) provides a process for individuals to vacate their convictions
because of their prior inability to understand the immigration consequences of their guilty plea.63 Courts have dismissed these motions at inperson hearings where the movant was not represented or even present
because, for example, they were in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention.64 Yet it is inconceivable that judges would have
dismissed these motions at hearings if they had been filed by counsel who
was absent with good cause rather than by detained individuals. Thus, a
two-tiered system of justice emerges—one for the represented and one
for the unrepresented, one for the wealthy and one for the poor65—despite efforts to reform the system.
The problem outlined in the previous part of this essay is not unique to
California. Florida, for example, passed a statute entitling individuals “to
obtain DNA testing and, if the results are exculpatory, a reversal of
[their] conviction.”66 For eight years after the statute was passed, James
Bain sought to obtain DNA testing, filing no less than “five separate
handwritten requests from his prison cell,” all of which were denied.67 It
was only when attorneys from the Florida Innocence Project began to
represent him that a judge was persuaded to order DNA testing.68 The
58. See, e.g., People v. Bonilla-Bray, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 754, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
59. Id. at 755–56.
60. Id. at 755.
61. Id. at 756.
62. See id. at 757 (“[A]s the People acknowledge, defendant’s petition alleges that he
met the statutory requirements under section 1170.91, subdivision (b).”).
63. PENAL § 1473.7(a)(1).
64. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 538, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (trial
court dismissed motion to vacate at a hearing where movant was in ICE custody so not
present and was not represented by counsel); People v. Fryhaat, 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42–43
(Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (same).
65. Cf. People v. Shipman, 397 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 1965) (observing that while “absolute equality is not required,” it “is now settled that whenever a state affords a direct or
collateral remedy to attack a criminal conviction, it cannot invidiously discriminate between rich and poor”).
66. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 215 (2011).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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testing proved his innocence.69 In all, Bain spent thirty-five years wrongfully incarcerated.70
This access-to-counsel issue also exists in the federal system. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission occasionally lowers the sentencing
range for various offenses, and people who are serving their sentences
may file a motion for a reduced sentence based on such a change.71 Yet
federal courts have held that these incarcerated individuals do not have a
right to counsel to pursue a reduction in their sentence.72 Despite the
complexity of the federal sentencing guidelines and the often adversarial
nature of a proceeding to reduce one’s sentence, incarcerated people
must fend for themselves against highly qualified government attorneys.73
The next section explores how the system has reached a point that leaves
so much to be desired in fulfilling the promises of criminal justice reform.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A bedrock constitutional right guaranteed at trial is the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.74 In 1963, the Supreme Court recognized this
right as applicable to the states.75 Specifically, the Court in Gideon v.
Wainwright held: “Not only [our] precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”76 That is to say,
no matter how equitable and procedurally correct the trial otherwise is,
the mere fact that the accused wanted to retain counsel but was too poor
69. Id.; Michael Shaffer, James Bain, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Dec. 27,
2019), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3008
[https://perma.cc/4BTB-48L9].
70. GARRETT, supra note 66, at 215; Shaffer, supra note 69 (stating that Bain spent
more time in prison “than any other person exonerated through DNA testing in the United
States” for a crime he did not commit and that “Bain was only 19 years old when convicted; he was 54 when he was finally set free.”).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The notion of
a statutory or constitutional right to counsel for § 3582(c)(2) motions has been rejected by
all of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue, and we agree with this consensus.”).
73. See Jona Goldschmidt, Has He “Made His Bed, and Now Must Lie in It”? Toward
Recognition of the Pro Se Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Post-Trial Readmonishment of the Right to Counsel, 8 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 287, 332 (2015) (“Since the creation
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the adoption of its Sentencing Guidelines, the
complexity of federal sentencing has surpassed that of the trial itself, such that defense
counsel is a necessity.” (citations omitted)); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1315
(2005) (describing the guidelines as “inordinately complex”).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
75. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (“We think the Court in Betts was
wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one
of these fundamental rights [made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment].”).
76. Id. at 344.
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to do so renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair.77 The right to effective assistance of counsel is such an elemental part of a fair trial that a
conviction will be reversed long after it has been obtained if an individual
can demonstrate that her lawyer was inadequate and the lawyer’s performance had a prejudicial effect.78 This right also extends to the punishment stage, with sentencing having been deemed a critical part of
criminal proceedings.79
However, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies only to
“criminal prosecutions,”80 and as such, it has limited application in the
post-conviction context.81 The Court determined that “a ‘criminal prosecution’ continues and the defendant remains an ‘accused’ . . . until a final
sentence is imposed.”82 Thus, for example, the Court held in Ross v. Moffitt that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to counsel to file a
discretionary appeal to a state supreme court.83 The Court distinguished
this kind of appeal from a trial, holding: “The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being ‘haled into
court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but
rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.”84 As a result,
while the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel when it is
needed as a “shield” against the government, its application is much diminished when it is sought to be used as a “sword.”85 This understanding
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a shield, coupled with the
historic structural emphasis on finality,86 means the path to post-convic77. See id. The denial of counsel at a critical stage of a state criminal proceeding requires automatic reversal. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (explaining that the Supreme Court has found “structural errors only in a very limited class of
cases,” including where there is a “total deprivation of the right to counsel”).
78. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
79. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134–37 (1967) (holding that the absence of
counsel at sentencing is a violation of the Sixth Amendment).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
81. See Martinez v. Ct. of App. of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 159–60 (2000) (“The Sixth
Amendment identifies the basic rights that the accused shall enjoy in ‘all criminal prosecutions.’ They are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at
the trial itself.”); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3–4, 10 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973).
82. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2019).
83. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618–19 (1974); Appeal, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL
L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/appeal [https://perma.cc/JX54-2AMS] (“An appeal of right is one that the higher court must hear, if the losing party demands it, while a
discretionary appeal is one that the higher court may, but does not have to, consider.”).
84. Ross, 417 U.S. at 610–11.
85. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), with Ross, 417 U.S. at
610–11.
86. See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (“One of the law’s very objects is the finality of its judgments. Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known. ‘Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of
much of its deterrent effect.’” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)); Stephen
B. Bright, The Intersection of Race and Poverty in Criminal Justice, University of Tennessee College of Law Summers-Wyatt Lecture (Sept. 27, 2010), in 8 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 166,
197 (“The courts have lost sight of justice in a tangle of procedural rules, pretenses and
administrative concerns so that finality—not justice—has become the ultimate goal of the
criminal courts.”).
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tion relief for the unjustly incarcerated is littered with roadblocks.87
IV. A FIX TO CONSIDER FOR REFORM EFFORTS
A. THE REACH

OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S RIGHT
COUNSEL

TO

In 1963’s Douglas v. California, the Court held that there is a right to
counsel to pursue a first appeal as of right in criminal cases.88 The Court
in Ross explained that “[t]he precise rationale for [Douglas] has never
been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.”89 While the Due Process Clause
emphasizes the state’s fair treatment of the individual, the Equal Protection Clause emphasizes equality in the state’s treatment of different classes of individuals.90 These two lines of analysis come together in the
holding of Douglas: “[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an
indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think
an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”91 Decades later, the Court relied on Douglas to hold that counsel must also be
appointed for defendants “who seek access to first-tier [appellate] review,” even when that review is not as of right.92
Professor Brandon L. Garrett has characterized this intersection of
concerns about equality and due process as “equal process.”93 In such
cases, “the combined concern with wealth inequality and unfair process
87. See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 126 (2012) (“All told, the post-conviction
road to freedom is strewn with procedural potholes.”); Uhrig, supra note 46 (discussing
how the limited right to counsel to seek post-conviction relief affects state prisoners who
file federal habeas corpus petitions).
88. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). In other words, on an appeal the
appellate court “must hear, if the losing party demands it.” Appeal, supra note 83.
89. Ross, 417 U.S. at 608–09; see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005)
(“Our decisions in point reflect ‘both equal protection and due process concerns.’” (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996))); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665
(1983) (“Due process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis in
these cases.”); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (“The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where [appellate] counsel
acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client . . . .”); Brandon L. Garrett,
Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 420–21 (2019).
Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (indicating that a
State may not “bolt the door to equal justice” to indigent defendants).
90. Ross, 417 U.S. at 609; see also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (“The equal protection
concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their
inability to pay core costs. . . . The due process concern homes in on the essential fairness
of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action.”); Garrett, supra note 89,
at 420–21.
91. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357.
92. Halbert, 545 U.S at 609–10 (holding that this result is required by the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses).
93. Garrett, supra note 89, at 397–98 (“Equal process theory has the potential to reinvigorate the Fourteenth Amendment as a guardian against unfair process and discrimination that increases inequality in society.”).
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results in a constitutional violation.”94 For him, one strong “reason to focus on the intersection between procedural due process and equality is
that it gets at the heart of an urgent, practical problem: indigent people
often suffer from both (1) arbitrary decision-making and inadequate access to courts, as well as, (2) the unequal outcomes that result.”95
As described in the previous Part, some state legislatures are increasingly making efforts to undo the effects of decades-long mass incarceration policies.96 These efforts include passing laws that reduce the
culpability or prison terms of incarcerated individuals who are serving
their sentences.97 Yet it may be difficult for such individuals to obtain the
benefit of these new laws without counsel—that is, to access the courts
and obtain equal outcomes.98
One possible fix is to recognize the broader reach of Douglas’s “equal
process” reasoning. To this end, it is useful to compare the rights at stake
in a generic first-tier criminal appeal with the rights at stake in a petition
for resentencing under section 1170.95 of the California Penal Code. A
petitioner under this section seeks to have her murder conviction vacated
and to be resentenced due to the change in California’s definition of felony murder.99 This comparison illustrates the continuing vitality of the
reasoning of Douglas, especially in an era of increasing economic inequality and intolerably high rates of incarceration.100
Most clearly, an individual’s first-tier appeal represents that person’s
first opportunity to raise an error that occurred in the trial court.101 If the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support a murder conviction, for example, and the court and jury found it sufficient anyway, a first-tier appeal is the first time the error can be challenged.102 The same is true for a
section 1170.95 petition. A person convicted of felony murder under a
newly invalid theory would have had no reason to mount such a challenge
earlier: the 1170.95 petition is their first chance.
In extending the Douglas right to counsel to those “who seek access to
first-tier [appellate] review,” even when that review is not as of right, the
Court in Halbert v. Michigan looked to two primary factors.103 “First,
94. Id. at 402.
95. Id. at 405.
96. See supra Part III.
97. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text.
98. See supra Part III.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch.10 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
100. See Garrett, supra note 89, at 451 (“In an era of rising income inequality, equal
process claims may have an important role to play.”); Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner,
Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/PJJ3-CU95] (“The U.S. locks
up more people per capita than any other nation, at the staggering rate of 698 per 100,000
residents.”); Bill Chappell, U.S. Income Inequality Worsens, Widening to a New Gap, NPR
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764654623/u-s-income-inequality-worsenswidening-to-a-new-gap [https://perma.cc/KY8T-69YV].
101. See GARRETT, supra note 66, at 194.
102. See id.
103. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 611 (2005).
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such an appeal entails an adjudication on the ‘merits.’ Second, first-tier
review differs from subsequent appellate stages ‘at which the claims have
once been presented by [appellate counsel] and passed upon by an appellate court.’”104 Both are true for section 1170.95 petitions as well. In determining whether to grant or deny the petition, the court examines the
merits of the petition, not the general importance of the question
presented.105 And one who files such a petition generally does not have
the benefit of previous appellate briefing on the issue.106
Further, in a direct appeal, there is a limited range of errors that can be
raised, given that the errors must appear in the trial record.107 The wide
range of errors that can be raised in a habeas corpus petition may be one
reason why the right to counsel on habeas is so restricted, as courts are
concerned about cost and efficiency.108 A section 1170.95 petition, however, is more akin to a direct appeal and is indeed even more limited
because only one type of error can be raised.109 Further, both the appellate process and the section 1170.95 petition process are formal, technical
processes where the assistance of skilled counsel could have the ultimate
benefit of overturning a conviction.110 And of course, in both instances,
while the wealthy can hire counsel to pursue these advantages, the poor
cannot.111 The combination of these factors encourages a closer examination of whether an unconstitutional line is once again being drawn between the rich and poor with regard to such criminal justice reform
104. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 356–57 (1963)).
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch.10 of 2021 Reg. Sess.);
see Halbert, 545 U.S. at 617–19.
106. See Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619 (“A first-tier review applicant, forced to act pro se, will
face a record unreviewed by appellate counsel, and will be equipped with no attorney’s
brief prepared for, or reasoned opinion by, a court of review.”); see also Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 614–15 (1974).
107. See GARRETT, supra note 66, at 194–95; see also, e.g., In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311,
316 (Cal. 1998) (“California law also recognizes that in some circumstances there may be
matters that undermine the validity of a judgment or the legality of a defendant’s confinement or sentence, but which are not apparent from the record on appeal, and that such
circumstances may provide a basis for a collateral challenge to the judgment through a writ
of habeas corpus.”).
108. Cf. Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 697, 736–43 (2007) (describing the broad scope of a habeas attorney’s work and
the delays associated with these proceedings).
109. See PENAL § 1170.95(a).
110. See id. § 1170.95; Halbert, 545 U.S. at 622 (“Michigan’s very procedures for seeking leave to appeal after sentencing on a plea, moreover, may intimidate the uncounseled.”); Martinez v. Ct. of App. of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (“No one, . . . attempts to
argue that as a rule pro se representation [in criminal appeals] is wise, desirable, or efficient. . . . Our experience has taught us that ‘a pro se defense is usually a bad defense,
particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.’”); Ross, 417 U.S. at 616; APP. DEFS., INC., ADI APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL
§ 4.2 (2d ed., rev. Apr. 2020), http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/manual/Chapter_4_Is
sue_spotting.pdf#202007 [https://perma.cc/836K-KSYJ] (“If something in the record, either
a factual matter or a point of law, seems puzzling, unfair, or otherwise not quite right,
counsel should pursue it until satisfied. Not knowing an answer is an easily solved problem.
Not even asking the right question can lead to disaster.”).
111. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963).
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efforts.112
Despite these similarities, some courts will hesitate to recognize the
broader reach of Douglas v. California. The Supreme Court has not recognized a right to counsel to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
even if the petition raises an issue that could not have been raised
before.113 In Pennsylvania v. Finley, the Court stated, “We have never
held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting
collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so hold today.”114 This was based, in part, on the fact that state habeas relief is far
removed from the criminal trial, and the proceeding is considered civil in
nature.115 The Court in Murray v. Giarratano affirmed Finley and held
that there is also no right to counsel for capital defendants to file habeas
corpus petitions.116 Then, in Coleman v. Thompson, the Court seemingly
left open the possibility of an exception to Finley and Giarratano for
claims that can only be raised in habeas proceedings.117 Yet courts must
be wary of importing the due process standards applicable to habeas
corpus petitions wholesale. The writ of habeas corpus occupies a unique
legal space, implicating finality and efficiency concerns that courts have
attempted to work through over decades.118 By contrast, criminal law reforms that the legislature makes retroactive are not similarly historically
fraught.
112. See id. at 357.
113. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 7.2(a) (7th ed. 2020) (“A more accurate summary of the Court’s treatment of the issue . . . is Justice Blackmun’s conclusion in his last opinion before retiring—
that the Court ‘thus far has declined to hold that indigent capital defendants have a right to
counsel.’”).
114. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (citation omitted). The Court
phrased its holding as regarding collateral review, which may encompass various statutory
petition processes. See Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 560 (2011). However, it appears that
state habeas relief was at issue in both Finley and Giarratano, not a statute retroactively
reducing culpability or a sentencing prescription, which would raise different concerns and
be more intertwined with the underlying criminal proceeding. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 553;
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 383 A.2d 898, 898
(Pa. 1978).
115. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556–57.
116. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10.
117. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755–56 (1991). In California, courts have
identified a constitutional right to habeas counsel once the petitioner has made out a prima
facie case for relief. People v. Frazier, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 806, 812 (Cal. App. 2020) (“In a
habeas corpus proceeding the right to counsel and a hearing is triggered only after the
petitioner has made a prima facie factual showing that, if unrebutted, demonstrates entitlement to relief.” (first citing People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252 (Cal. 1995); and then citing In
re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993))).
118. See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating
that there is no right to counsel to file a post-conviction petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
because such petitions are “frequently frivolous,” “may be resubmitted,” and “are not a
part of the basic processes for determining guilt”); Stidham v. United States, 170 F.2d 294,
297 (8th Cir. 1948) (“The claim is that after the court had pronounced sentence he was
denied the assistance of counsel to aid him in preparing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. . . . In this connection it should be borne in mind that an application for writ of
habeas corpus is not a criminal proceeding but a civil one, and the court was not required
by the Constitution or by statute to furnish the defendant counsel to prepare a petition for
the writ.”).
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LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

From a practical perspective, appellate defenders are well-situated to
protect individuals’ rights under these statutes. For one, the types of criminal justice reform statutes that this essay has addressed often generate an
astonishing amount of appellate litigation.119 If courts were to appoint
appellate defenders at an early stage, those attorneys could generate an
appropriate record for appeal in the trial court and later pursue an appeal, if merited. Representation not only aids petitioners but also courts,
because attorneys can advise their clients if a petition or appeal is even
worth filing.120 Further, appellate defenders will not have a never-ending
task under new statutes because at a certain point the vast majority of
those who are eligible for relief under a retroactively applicable statute
receive relief, and few people remain. The statutes themselves could also
provide a date by which all petitions must be filed.121
Scholars, including Eve Brensike Primus, have long argued that states
should consider expanding or altering the role of appellate counsel.122 As
Professor Primus explains, appellate attorneys are often prevented from
raising meritorious issues, either because those issues are forfeited, or
most saliently because the issue is trial counsel’s ineffectiveness itself.123
Various procedural rules limit the matters appellate defenders may raise
on direct appeal only to those issues that appear on the face of the trial
record.124 Trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is often a structural problem resulting from excessive caseloads and lack of funding.125 To prove that ineffectiveness undermines a conviction, counsel typically must investigate,
develop, and introduce new evidence—a task beyond appellate defenders’ usual scope of appointment.126 Because the role of appellate defenders is as circumscribed as it is, Professor Primus finds that “the system
119. See, e.g., CCAP Prop. 47 Case Summaries, CENT. CAL. APP. PROGRAM, https://
www.capcentral.org/criminal/sentencing/prop47/prop47_cases.asp [https://perma.cc/
9NMM-QXU5] (providing an extensive compilation of cases decided by California appellate courts on Proposition 47).
120. Cf. Brief Amici Curiae, Lewis, supra note 51, at 14 (“Because the various legal
theories of homicide are complex and not at all intuitive, the Legislature knew that some
people would incorrectly believe they were eligible for relief under SB 1437. The Legislature anticipated there would be meritless petitions, not necessarily as a result of any knowing falsehood on the part of the petitioner, but as a result of a misapprehension of the law
or facts as it applied to a particular person’s case.”).
121. See, e.g., Information Re: California’s Two and Three Strikes Law, PRISON L. OFF.
(Oct. 2017), http://prisonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ThreeStrikesOct-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZJL4-SQP7 ] (“The deadline for filing a Proposition 36 petition ran out
on November 6, 2014; at this late date, a court can consider a petition filed only if the
prisoner shows good cause for not filing a petition earlier.”).
122. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682, 685 (2007); see also A.
C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating Criminal
Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1162–63, 1169 (1997).
123. Primus, supra note 122, at 681–82, 688–89.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 686–88.
126. See id. at 689; In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 783 n.20 (Cal. 1993) (noting that noncapital appellate counsel have “no obligation to conduct an investigation to discover if facts
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underutilizes criminal appellate attorneys” and so does not take full advantage of a “valuable resource.”127
The prescription proposed by this essay seeks to address that concern
to an extent. Appellate defenders—skilled at reviewing trial records, examining the legislative history of statutes, interpreting ambiguous statutory language, and persuasively arguing on behalf of incarcerated
clients—are well-positioned to advance individuals’ rights under new
criminal laws.128 There is an added benefit to appellate defenders themselves, in that the change has the potential to improve appellate defenders’ morale and conception of their work, as well as foster better working
relationships with trial defenders.129 However, while this proposal does
not impose any additional burdens on trial public defenders,130 their appellate counterparts may require additional funding to adequately carry
out this new role.131
With respect to funding, there is a structural benefit to assigning this
role to appellate defenders. In many states, appellate-defense services are
organized at the state level.132 California, for example, leaves the management and funding of trial-level representation to its counties, but provides statewide funding for appellate representation.133 This statewide
outside the record on appeal would support a petition for habeas corpus or other challenge
to the judgment”).
127. Primus, supra note 122, at 706. However, there are wide variations in the roles and
responsibilities of appellate defenders, including client-centered approaches. See Jonah A.
Siegel, Jeanette M. Hussemann & Dawn Van Hoek, Client-Centered Lawyering and the
Redefining of Professional Roles Among Appellate Public Defenders, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 579, 583 (2017) (contrasting the traditional “four corners” approach to appellate defense
with client-centered approaches).
128. See Primus, supra note 122, at 722–23; Deena Jo Schneider, The Complete Appellate Advocate: Beyond Brief Writing, ABA (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/judicial/publications/appellate_issues/2019/summer/the-complete-appellate-advo
cate-beyond-brief-writing [https://perma.cc/EXF3-TS7D].
129. See Primus, supra note 122, at 704 (“Appellate attorneys can almost always find
some issue to brief if they search hard enough, but it is demoralizing to spend so much time
and energy locating and briefing meritless issues.”); Carol Foster, The Trial and Appellate
Counsel Relationship: The “A.C.E.” Approach, CENT. CAL. APP. PROGRAM, https://
www.capcentral.org/procedures/case_manag/docs/ACE_approach.pdf (discussing the importance of communication and mutual understanding between trial and appellate
counsel).
130. See Joe, Mass Prosecution, supra note 18, at 1177–81, 1177 n.4 (describing the welldocumented caseload crisis that trial-level public defenders often face). By directly assigning appellate defenders to these cases, states will avoid the duplication of work that
results from representation by a trial defender, then an appellate defender.
131. See Siegel et al., supra note 127, at 601 (“[A]ppellate public defender offices are
typically massively underfunded, such that lawyers are forced to provide representation
under tight timelines with little access to the experts and evidence that could drastically
improve their cases.”).
132. Colorado, Illinois, and Maryland are just three examples. See Appellate Division,
OFF. COLO. ST. PUB. DEF., https://www.coloradodefenders.us/offices/appellate-division
[https://perma.cc/UCX2-F35K]; About Us, ILL. ST. APP. DEF., https://www2.illinois.gov/
osad/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/9MR5-DJT3]; Appellate Division, MD.
OFF. PUB. DEF., https://www.opd.state.md.us/appellate [https://perma.cc/Q3QN-GR8F].
133. Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Structuring the Public Defender, 106 IOWA L. REV. 113,
130 n.84 (2020); see also id. at 126 n.65, 141 n.152; Appellate Projects in California, APP.
DEFS., INC., http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/ca_legal_projects.asp [https://perma.cc/
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funding scheme can aid in ensuring stable, uniform representation
throughout the state.134 It may also lead appellate defenders to formulate
statewide litigation strategies so that their clients can best profit from new
laws.135 By expanding the scope of appellate defenders’ appointments in
this way, states can better utilize their skills and knowledge, while also
advancing criminal justice reform goals.
Crucially, to ensure that appellate defenders are appointed and have a
well-defined scope of appointment, state legislatures enacting criminal
justice reform efforts should include detailed and specific right-to-counsel
provisions. Such provisions will reduce the need for litigation over if and
when the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to counsel attaches to each reform statute. This, in fact, was what the drafters of California Penal Code
section 1170.95 made an effort to do.136 Though California courts first
interpreted the statute in a narrow way, the California Supreme Court
ultimately held that there is a statutory right to counsel once a petitioner
files a facially sufficient petition.137 The California experience will hopefully encourage future legislators to continue to strive for clarity and
specificity. Further, increased recognition that this right to counsel is not
only statutory but also rooted in fundamental equal protection and due
process principles is invaluable.138 This recognition should foster respect
for, and protection of, the right to counsel in a new legal landscape.
V. CONCLUSION
The meaningful reform efforts that have captured the nation’s attention should not be limited only to those who can afford counsel. It is also
not enough for rules of criminal liability and procedure to change for the
better only for those to come.139 The harm that, for example, overly puniSWJ4-5TH5] (providing a list of the regionally based non-profit appellate projects in
California).
134. See Joe, supra note 133, at 143–48, 162–63 (“[S]cholars have found that state
budget appropriations provide more equitable funding and are better able to ensure uniform practices across a state.”).
135. The appellate projects in California, for example, publish numerous practice articles for defenders to consult on changing criminal laws and practices. See Practice Articles,
APP. DEFS., INC., http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/pract_articles.asp [https://perma.cc/
ZW7Z-79DW]; Criminal Articles, CENT. CAL. APP. PROGRAM, https://www.capcentral.org/
criminal/articles/index.asp [https://perma.cc/3P4J-GGXF]; Articles & Outlines, FIRST DIST.
APP. PROJECT, https://www.fdap.org/resource/articles [https://perma.cc/4NN6-2A7S]; cf.
Daniel Epps & William Ortman, One Change That Could Make American Criminal Justice
Fairer, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/
america-needs-defender-general/608002 [https://perma.cc/F9EK-6NNT] (describing the desirability of a public “Office of the Defender General,” which “would be responsible for
advocating for the collective interests of criminal defendants” in cases that reach the U.S.
Supreme Court).
136. See Brief Amici Curiae, Lewis, supra note 51, at 16–20.
137. See People v. Lewis, S260598, 2021 WL 3137434, at *1 (Cal. July 26, 2021).
138. See supra Section IV.A.
139. See, e.g., Assemblymember Kalra Announces New California Racial Justice Act for
All, CWP (Jan. 15, 2021), https://womenprisoners.org/2021/01/for-immediate-release-assemblymember-kalra-announces-new-california-racial-justice-act-for-all [https://perma.cc/
299W-AWWJ] (“It is incumbent upon us to make sure that all Californians are afforded an
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tive sentencing rules have caused should be addressed in a thoughtful way
that looks backward too and enables prior defendants of all resourcing
positions to benefit.140 Achieving such change takes foresight on the part
of legislators in choosing among a range of possible procedural options. If
the process is to be largely non-adversarial, many of the burdens of providing relief to individuals can be allocated to state actors such as prosecutors and even courts.141 But if the process is to be hotly contested, it is
crucial that would-be petitioners are appointed counsel early and in an
efficient way. Appellate defenders, already tasked with fulfilling the
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel and asserting the rights of incarcerated individuals under new statutes, are well-positioned to take on this
additional role.142 Some criminal law reform statutes may themselves implicate a right to counsel that is grounded in the interplay of equal protection and due process principles.143 Appointing counsel to would-be
petitioners as early as possible would not only protect such individuals’
rights, it would be a sure way to deliver on the promises driving new
criminal justice reforms.

opportunity to pursue justice by making the [Racial Justice Act] retroactive—ensuring that
these new protections are rightfully extended to those who have already been harmed by
unfair convictions and sentences.”).
140. See Weihua Li & Nicole Lewis, This Chart Shows Why the Prison Population Is So
Vulnerable to COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2020/03/19/this-chart-shows-why-the-prison-population-is-so-vulnerable-tocovid-19 [https://perma.cc/95UZ-LCL5] (“Why are there so many older adults behind
bars? Some scholars point to harsh sentencing laws imposed in the 1980s and 1990s as a
factor.”).
141. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing &
Other Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside [https://
perma.cc/QN9Z-D39X] (showing that some states offer automatic expungement or sealing
of some convictions).
142. See supra Part IV.B; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
143. See supra Part IV.A.
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